

24 July 1984


NOTE FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
FROM: Associate Deputy Director for Intelligence

Attached is the proposed response to the SSCI report directing you to develop a program establishing a "core level" analytic effort against the countries listed in DCID 1/2. The response discusses the current and projected allocations and (on page 13) proposes a two-part plan to enhance our capabilities.

The response to the SSCI tries to be responsive to their concern and acknowledges the problem of providing analyst coverage for areas that may suddenly demand our attention. Obviously, it falls somewhat short of one analyst per country.

One issue that you should be aware of is that DIA sees in the Senate Select approach an opportunity to get additional resources. We have argued that this is not a very effective approach because even our supporters on the SSCI believe that the resources they have given us over the past few years should have improved our coverage. In the SSCI hearings last spring Bob Gates emphasized how our capabilities have improved. DIA tended to emphasize their gaps and took a real beating from the Members.

This response has been coordinated with DIA, INR, and the IC Staff.

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Richard J. Kerr

STAT

Washington, D.C. 20505

DDI# 4255/84

28 JUL 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Honorable Barry M. Goldwater
Chairman, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence
SUBJECT : Building a "Core Intelligence Capability"
REFERENCE : SSCI Report on FY 1985 NFIP Budget

1. In response to your comments, as conveyed by Senator Wallop, on the need to assign analytical resources realistically and effectively, I share your concern that the Intelligence Community make every effort to provide the necessary coverage over the entire range of countries, regions, and topics of interest to the United States. As you are well aware, there are certain resource limitations which prevent the depth of analyst assignments that we might prefer under other circumstances. Nevertheless, I feel that within these limitations we are steadily developing the intelligence base needed by our customers. The attached report shows how this is being done.

2. I hasten to add that we are certainly thin in covering some countries which are currently viewed to be of low priority, and that some of these countries could quickly become crisis areas. So there is room for improvement. I have proposed some changes which will, to the best of our ability, help anticipate these occurrences.

3. I hope that this response will satisfy your present concern.

WJS/DM

William J. Casey

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2 July 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR: Acting Deputy Director for Intelligence
FROM: Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT: SSCI Report on FY 1985 NFIP Budget

1. The Senate report on the 1985 authorization directs a program to establish a "core" level of analytic effort against each country listed in DCID 1/2 and to provide implementation plans no later than 30 September 1984. Would you review with me what this calls for even though it may or may not survive the final cut as agreed in conference. It is clearly something that is very much on their minds and we should figure out what they are trying to get at. I attach page 18 of the report which gives you the gist of it.

2. The report also directs that [redacted] authorized for external research be obligated only to conduct studies to be carried out by teams composed of eminent and/or expert nongovernment persons who shall have access to all data relevant to their studies, and that included in these studies shall be [redacted] 25X1

would be knocked out in conference but would like to know what we would do if we had to use [redacted] for this type of thing. 25X1


William J. Casey

Attachment:
Page 18 of Report

[redacted] 25X1

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Core Intelligence Capability

25X1

The DCI requests an increase of more than [redacted] personnel in FY1985 to support expanded analysis and production and related support activities. This request continues the significant expansion of analytic manpower begun in 1979. However, despite major manpower increases authorized in the past for analysis and production, data provided to the Committee indicates that relatively few of the 166 countries listed in DCID 1/2 as being of interest to U.S. intelligence, receive adequate analytic attention. There is reason to believe that the absence of such analytic research is a factor in the inability of the Community to develop a comprehensive worldwide intelligence data base needed to provide surge and contingency support.

Accordingly, the Committee directs the DCI to develop a program to establish a "core" level of analytic effort against each country listed in DCID 1/2 and provide implementation plans to the Committee no later than September 30, 1984. This plan should address the full range of intelligence requirements listed in DCID 1/2 and assess if full time political, economic, and military analysts are required on a country by country basis. Further, the plan should identify those "core" analysis positions requiring a language proficiency. The DCI shall designate, from among the total

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positions authorized for analysis and production in fiscal year 1985, a sufficient number of positions to provide the "core" level of analysis identified in this plan. With the exception of positions specifically allocated by this report* to foreign counterintelligence analysis and the intelligence activities of the Departments of Energy and Treasury, none of the funds authorized for increased civilian positions for analysis and production in fiscal year 1985, may be obligated until such time as the DCI submits his plan to the Committee and the Committee approves that plan, as recommended by the Director of Central Intelligence, and confirmed by a letter from the Chairman and Vice Chairman of the Intelligence Committee to strengthen our capabilities for research and analysis.

None of these additional activities that were recommended in the basic concepts of database policy for use to the Director of Central Intelligence, a political perspective and an operational perspective, that they can be used in further information gathering and analysis of the Soviet Union's foreign policy, intelligence and support for the activities of terrorist organizations.

* Those positions exempted are FBI Foreign Counterintelligence, the Department of Energy and the Department of Treasury.

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